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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Martin Ish appeals from his judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of one
count of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, Mr. Ish asserts that the district court committed
reversible error when it denied his Batson challenge after the prosecution peremptorily struck all
six minority jurors from the venire panel. Mr. Ish further asserts that the district court erred by
quashing his subpoena duces tecum for the prosecution's voir dire notes; by allowing the in-court
identifications by two State's witnesses who had never previously identified Mr. Ish but who had
recently watched the news programs identifying Mr. Ish as a suspect; by admitting prohibited
404(b) propensity evidence; by negating the difference between two lesser included offenses in
response to the jury's question; and by denying Mr. Ish's motion to dismiss and requested jury
instruction regarding spoliation. These errors violated Mr. Ish's right to a fair trial, right to
present a defense, and his right to due process. Further, Mr. Ish maintains these errors in the
aggregate, if not individually harmful, deprived him of the right to a fair trial. For these reasons,
Mr. Ish respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's erroneous assertions that Mr. Ish did
not establish a violation of his rights to equal protection, error by the district court in admitting
prohibited I.R.E. 404(b) testimony where the act in stepping forward in a threatening manner
constituted a threat of violence (a bad act) which was used to show Mr. Ish's propensity to
threaten or become violent, and error by the district court in denying Mr. Ish's motion to dismiss
where he established bad faith, and error in denying his requested jury instructions regarding
spoliation because Mr. Ish demonstrated a significant degree of prejudice resulting from the
government's misdoings.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Ish's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are incorporated
herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the State violate Mr. Ish's rights to equal protection when it used its peremptory
challenges to strike all six minority venire persons from the jury?

II.

Did the district court err in quashing Mr. Ish's subpoena duces tecum for the
prosecution's voir dire notes?

III.

Did the district court err in admitting unreliable in-court witness identifications?

IV.

Did the district court err in admitting prohibited 404(b) propensity evidence?

V.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Ish's motion for dismissal and then a jury
instruction based on the State's spoliation of evidence?

VI.

Did the district court err in answering the jury's question by telling it that the
manslaughter elements "produced" and "cause" were synonyms?

VII.

Did these errors in the aggregate deprive Mr. Ish of his right to a fair trial?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The State Violated Mr. Ish's Right To Equal Protection When It Used Its Peremptory Challenges
To Strike All Six Minority Persons From The Venire Panel
The State asserts that the prosecution gave clear and reasonably specific reasons why it
struck each juror; thus, the district court did not err in concluding that Mr. Ish failed to prove
purposeful discrimination. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-13.) The State also claims that it is no
matter that the district court believed that the prosecution moved to strike Juror No. 3, when in
fact it was the defense who sought to exclude that juror for cause. (Respondent's Brief, p.13.)
Although Mr. Ish has only specifically addressed the State's arguments as to Juror No. 3 in this
Reply Brief, Mr. Ish maintains all of the assertions of error made in his Appellant's Brief
The prosecutor struck all six minority persons from the 38-person jury panel, and
stipulated that the six persons identified by the defense were minority persons. (Trial Tr., p.414,
Ls.10-16; p.415, Ls.1-16; R., p.1097.) In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court
established a three-step inquiry to determine if peremptory challenges have been exercised in a
discriminatory manner. 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986); see also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S.
162, 168 (2005); State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 87 (1993); State v. Ornelas, 156 Idaho 727, 732
(Ct. App. 2014). "The Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions
and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process." Johnson, 545
U.S. at 172-73. To establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the
venire, a defendant must show: (1) that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the
prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the
defendant's race; (2) that he may rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury
selection practice that permits discrimination; and (3) that these facts and any other relevant
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circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude the
veniremen from the petit jury because of their race. Batson, 476 U.S at 96.
As the State conceded, Mr. Ish established a prima facie claim of discriminatory purpose
because the State used six of its twelve challenges to remove all of the minority members of the
38-member panel, leaving zero minority jurors.

(Respondent's Brief, p.9; Trial Tr., p.414,

Ls.10-17; R., pp.1362, 1097.) The burden then shifted to the State to adequately explain the
exclusion by offering a race-neutral justification for each of its strikes. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94;

Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87. The strike of even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory
purpose is constitutionally forbidden. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008). Appellate
courts will only overturn the district court's decision under the third step of the Batson analysis if
the district court's findings are "clearly erroneous in light of the facts as a whole." State v.

Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 87 (1993); Ornelas, 156 Idaho at 732. Factual findings will be held to be
clearly erroneous "only when unsupported by substantial and competent evidence." Id. (quoting

State v. Kinser, 141 Idaho 557, 560 (Ct. App. 2005)).
If a race-neutral reason is offered for the challenge, the district court must then determine
whether that explanation overcomes the inference of discrimination established by the
defendant's prima facie showing. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87. Even where
the prosecution's reasons for striking minority members of the venire appear race neutral, the
application of these rationales to the venire might be selective and based on racial considerations.

See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 343 (2003) (reversing and remanding for further
proceedings).
When the prosecution provided reasons why it peremptorily struck Juror No. 3, the
prosecutor said:
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I believe we did an in-camera interview with her; and she was familiar with the
case-this particular case from Facebook-including media articles and was very
uncertain about whether or not she would be able to set those, whatever it was she
had read and learned, whether she'd be able to set that aside if she was a juror.
(Tr., p.410, Ls.1-8.)

The district court confirmed that the State challenged her for cause.

(Tr., p.410, Ls.11-15.) The State claimed also that "she seemed a bit out ofit, like she was kind
of zoned out" and possibly "zoned out/high." 1 (Tr., p.410, Ls.18-24.) The State also noted that
because this juror was taking medicine for anxiety or panic attacks, it believed she might be
distracted. (R., p.1117.)
In determining whether to accept the State's justification as to why No. 3 was struck, the
district court correctly found that this juror was subject to questioning about her knowledge of
the case from the media away from the other jurors.

(Trial Tr., p.184, L.6 - p.194, L.16.)

However, the court incorrectly found that the State had moved to dismiss the juror for cause due
to her knowledge of the case from the media. (Trial Tr., p.410, Ls.1-15; R., p.1098). In fact, it
was the defense who sought to have her struck for cause after she essentially said she had
prejudged the case and believed Mr. Ish was guilty, based on what she had seen or heard from
the media. (Trial Tr., p.194, Ls.17-22.) Further, the district court failed to recall that the State
argued against the defense's motion to strike for cause:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I guess, for the record, I would challenge for cause. Part
of the reason we came here is to try and escape the media blitz. 2
THE COURT: We'll never escape Facebook.

1

While deference to the trial judge's evaluation must be given when the trial judge has made a
finding that an attorney credibly relied on demeanor in exercising a strike, the record must
indicate that the trial judge actually made a specific finding concerning the prospective juror's
demeanor. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 479. The district court made no finding confirming the State's
perception of Juror No. 3 's demeanor.
2
Counsel is referring to the change of venue from Bannock County to Twin Falls. (R., p.879.)
6

DEFENSE COUNSEL:
challenge for cause.

Yeah.

So I appreciate your honesty, but I would

THE COURT: [Prosecutor], do you want to respond?
PROSECUTOR: Well, I think she said that, you know, she was really -- I can't
remember exact words -- but I think, committed to trying to set aside anything
she's heard in the media and consider only the facts presented at trial. And I think
that's really ultimately all we can expect from any juror if they may have heard
something as to be committed to that, although I know there was some
equivocation.
(Trial Tr., p.188, L.17 - p.195, L.6.) Arguing against a strike for cause, when Juror No. 3's
demeanor and medical history had already been observed, eviscerates the prosecution's nondiscriminatory reasons for peremptorily striking this juror.
Further, because the district court did not analyze any additional reasons for the strike, it
failed to make a determination of whether any of the State's other reasons were credible.
(R., pp.1098, 1100.) Thus, the district court erred in finding the strike was valid and not a
pretext for racial discrimination-its decision is plainly contradicted by the record. The district
court's finding that the State tried to strike for cause because of media knowledge was
''unsupported by substantial and competent evidence."

The court's determination that the

prosecution supplied an adequate race-neutral justification as to why it struck Juror No. 3 was
clearly erroneous.
In light of the information available to the district court, its finding that the State did not
use its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner is clearly erroneous. See Araiza, 124
Idaho at 87. The prosecutor used six of his peremptory challenges to strike all six minority
jurors on the venire panel. Mr. Ish asserts that the district court erred in overruling/denying his
Batson challenge which violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
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Amendment.

Because choosing a petit vemre panel utilizing discriminatory methods 1s a

structural error, Mr. Ish seeks a new trial.

II.
The District Court Erred In Quashing Mr. Ish's Subpoena Duces Tecum For The
Prosecution's Voir Dire Notes
Mr. Ish asserts that, after his trial, Mr. Ish sought access (through a subpoena duces
tecum) to the prosecution's voir dire notes, in support of his motion for a new trial which
included a renewed Batson challenge. The State moved to quash the subpoena, asserting that its
voir dire notes constituted protected work product. The district court agreed, and quashed the
subpoena after finding the notes to be privileged. Mr. Ish contends that the district court abused
its discretion in quashing his subpoena duces tecum. Specifically, he contends that the district
court erred in its analysis where it neglected to analyze whether the work product protection was
applicable: ( 1) where compliance was not unreasonable or oppressive, (2) where the protections
had been waived by the disclosure of portions of the notes in response to the Batson challenge,
(3) where disclosure was necessary because the notes were the only means of determining
whether the prosecution unlawfully struck jurors because of race. The district court failed to
recognize the parameters of the work product doctrine, and erred in its analysis under
I.C.R. 17(b), when it quashed the subpoena.
Mr. Ish fully set forth his arguments on this issue in his initial Appellant's Brief, and the
State's arguments do not necessitate a response.
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III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing Two Witnesses To Make In-Court
Identifications Of Mr. Ish Where The Identifications Were More Prejudicial Than Probative
Mr. Ish asserted that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed Linda
Loveday Wood and Jenny Hill each to make in-court identifications of Mr. Ish as the person in
the Bourbon Barrel the night of June 14, 2009. The in-court identifications were unreliable and
more prejudicial than probative as these two witnesses had not been shown a line-up or
otherwise identified Mr. Ish in the seven years between the incident and Mr. Ish's trial. Further,
neither witness could offer much information to describe the person they saw nearly seven years
ago, but both readily admitted to seeing Mr. Ish's picture in the news as a suspect in the Red Elk
homicide. Mr. Ish asserts that the in-court identifications were unreliable and should not have
been admitted, because the district court failed to analyze the witnesses' testimony in light of the
prejudicial nature versus the probative value pursuant to I.R.E. 403.
Mr. Ish fully set forth his arguments on this issue in his initial Appellant's Brief, and the
State's arguments do not warrant additional discussion.

IV.
The District Court Erred In Allowing Testimony Regarding Mr. Ish's Prior Bad Acts In The
Bourbon Barrel
There were two witnesses who testified that Mr. Ish was taking cigarettes from behind
the bar and was then asked to leave, at which point he became angry. (Trial Tr., p.481, Ls.3-12;
p.483, Ls.17-21; p.492, Ls.15-23; p.493, Ls.3-10; p.494, Ls.4-11.)

The Bourbon Barrel's

bartender, Linda Loveday Wood, testified that Mr. Ish, "walked over behind the bar and tried to
take some cigarettes from behind the bar, and he came back out and I told him he had to leave."
(Trial Tr., p.481, Ls.3-7.) When he was told to leave by the owner, "he got angry at her." (Trial
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Tr., p.481, Ls.8-12.) The witness testified that he stepped towards the owner, and his demeanor
was angry, he was yelling. 3 (Trial Tr., p.483, Ls.17-21.)
The State purports to understand that Mr. Ish is arguing that the act of taking cigarettes
could not show a propensity for violence because it just shows a propensity for theft.
(Respondent's Brief, p.24.) Yet, after claiming that Mr. Ish's argument is centered around a
theft, the State ultimately concedes that Mr. Ish asserts that the "[ e]vidence of this chain of
events was highly relevant to understanding the events of the evening in question, and
marginally, at best, indicative that Ish had a propensity for violence." (Respondent's Brief, p.24)
(emphasis added.)
The state next claims that the argument was unpreserved, "Because Ish did not object to
evidence he took cigarettes, evidence that he was asked to leave, or evidence that he was angry,
this issue is not preserved for appellate review." (Respondent's Brief, pp.22-23.) This argument
is clearly controverted by the record where defense counsel sought to have the actual conduct
and Mr. Ish's reaction to being asked to leave the bar excluded: "If [the State] want to go into
specifics of alleged threats, then we do object." (Trial Tr., p.458, L.5 - p.459, L.5; Appellant's
Brief, pp.37; 40.) The argument is preserved for review.
The unruly conduct in the Bourbon Barrel was admitted in order to show Mr. Ish's
propensity to become angry and threaten violence when told to leave a bar; however, this
testimony should not have been admitted, as it did not fall within the I.R.E. 404(b) exceptions,
and was only admitted in an attempt to prove Mr. Ish's alleged violent action in killing Mr. Red

3

The jury heard the witness testify that he became angry at the owner and "acted like he was
going to start after the owner," before defense counsel objected as to the question calling for a
conclusion. (Tr., p.481, Ls.10-22.) The district court sustained the objection. (Tr., p.481, Ls.2324.)
10

Elk conformed with his prior bad acts-his tendency to threaten or resort to violence. Although
the State claims the testimony was to show "state of mind," there is no evidence that when
Mr. Ish arrived at Duffy's Bar he was angry or upset; thus, the conduct at the Bourbon Barrel
could not be demonstrative of Mr. Ish's "state of mind," and admitting the testimony was error.
The State also posits that Mr. Ish' s argument is focused on him becoming angry upon
being told to leave the Bourbon Barrel, and that is simply a mental state, not information offered
as character evidence. (Respondent's Brief, p.24.) However, in order for this Court to adopt this
line of reasoning, the Court must ignore the meaning of "threat."

The State's argument

necessarily assumes that Mr. Ish's act of moving aggressively toward Ms. Wood and Ms. Hill
was not a "threat" presumably because Mr. Ish did not ( audibly) utter threatening words. This
premise fails. Even the pattern jury instruction for assault provides "threatens by word or act."
I.C.J.I. 1201. The prior bad act was a threat to do violence manifested by an aggressive move
forward towards Ms. Hill.
The State claims the error is harmless because "Ish's anger did not result in violence at
the Bourbon Barrel," and asserts that "[b]eyond a reasonable doubt, the result would be the same
without presenting all of the evidence of the events immediately preceding the crime."
(Respondent's Brief, p.25.) However, the State fails to prove the error harmless where the jury
heard that Mr. Ish was behaving badly at the Bourbon Barrel, and, upon being ordered to leave,
he took a threatening step towards the owner, compelling her to grab a baseball bat in order to
protect herself. (Tr., p.493, Ls.2-25.) The jury likely believed that Mr. Ish was a person who
resorted to violence when asked to leave a bar and that propensity made him guilty for Mr. Red
Elk's death.
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Mr. Ish asserts that the district court erred in admitting the testimony because it was
impermissible I.R.E. 404(b) propensity evidence that did not fall within the exceptions; further,
the district court failed to analyze the prejudicial nature of the witnesses' testimony versus the
probative value, pursuant to I.R.E. 403.

V.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ish's Motion To Dismiss As A Sanction For
Spoliation And By Refusing To Give Mr. Ish's Requested Jury Instruction On Spoliation
Mr. Ish asserts that the State's actions of destroying the original recordings of the
surveillance video, testifying inconsistently, and entirely botching the chain of custody, have
deprived Mr. Ish of due process and that the district court erred in refusing to give his requested
jury instruction on spoliation.

A.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ish's Motion To Dismiss After The State
Destroyed The Original Surveillance Video
The State asserts that the district court's determination that there was "no bad faith"

surrounding the destruction of the original videocassette was supported by substantial, competent
evidence. (Respondent's Brief, p.29.) Although the State concedes that the "failure to follow
procedures was evidence of bad faith," it claims that, when weighed with "the other evidence,"
the court properly concluded that the destruction was negligent but not in bad faith.
(Respondent's Brief, p.29.) Mr. Ish established bad faith and the district court's decision was
erroneous. Once a determination of bad faith has been made, Mr. Ish has shown a due process
violation and he is entitled to dismissal.
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed the issue of the government's destruction of an
audio recording of the defendant's confession in State v. Lewis, 144 Idaho 64, 67 (2007). The
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Lewis Court analyzed the destruction of evidence by the State and employed the following

balancing test in a criminal context:
(1) whether the evidence was material to the question of guilt or the degree of
punishment; (2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the loss or destruction
of the evidence; and (3) whether the government was acting in good faith when it
destroyed or lost the evidence.
Id. (quoting State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 781 (1997)). The Lewis Court also explained the

burden of proof:
Where the value of the evidence is known, the person asserting the due process
violation has the affirmative burden of establishing the materiality and prejudice
elements of the balancing test. Id. Where the value of the evidence is unknown,
the materiality and prejudice elements are presumed and the inquiry focuses on
the presence of bad faith.
Id. In Lewis, the Court held that there was no basis for finding a due process violation because

there was no indication that the government acted suspiciously regarding a particular item or
category of potential evidence. Id. 144 Idaho at 68.
Here, because the evidentiary value of the original VHS tape was unknown, Mr. Ish is
required to show bad faith on the part of the State in order to establish a violation of his due
process rights. See Id; see also Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806 (1995). However, bad faith does
not have to be intentional or malicious to violate due process. In Courtney v. Big O Tires, Inc.,
139 Idaho 821 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court explained:
The merely negligent loss of evidence will not support that inference [of bad
faith], nor would the intentional destruction of an item that a party had no reason
to believe had any evidentiary significance at the time it was destroyed. There
may be circumstances, however, where such inference could be drawn from the
reckless loss or destruction of evidence.
Id. 139 Idaho at 824 (emphasis added). In Stuart v. State, the government's discovery violation

served as a proximate cause of the destruction of possibly exculpatory evidence. 127 Idaho at
816. "[C]oncealment is one method of proving that the exculpatory value of the evidence was
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known to the government prior to its destruction." Id. The Stuart Court analyzed the State's
intentional destruction of evidence of unknown value and concluded that the discovery violation
operated to conceal the existence of the taping which violated the Mr. Stuart's right to due
process. Id. The Court held that the failure to provide discovery regarding taped phone calls, the
disclosure of which would have undoubtedly led to further discovery of the surreptitious tape
recording at issue, was "a sufficiently proximate cause of the destruction of the phone log so as
to rise to the level of bad faith under Youngblood." Id. at 816. The Stuart Court held:
In a criminal case, application of a favorable inference under the spoliation
doctrine is the appropriate remedy for a Youngblood due process violation.

Id. at 816 (internal citation omitted). The Court held that Mr. Stuart was entitled to a favorable
inference regarding the destroyed evidence and remanded the case with instructions to reweigh
the evidence and give Mr. Stuart a favorable inference concerning the phone logs. Id. at 816-17.
The State acknowledges the district court's finding that Mr. Ish filed a motion to compel
before the prosecution would tum over a DVD copy of the Duffy's Bar surveillance video taken
of the night Mr. Red Elk was hit. (Respondent's Brief, p.26.) The State concedes that "failure to
follow procedures was evidence of bad faith." (Respondent's Brief, p.29.) But it nonetheless
claims that, when weighed with "the other evidence," the court properly concluded that the
destruction was negligent but not in bad faith. (Respondent's Brief, p.29.) This conclusion is
untenable when viewed alongside the multitude of violations of procedures and policy as well as
the inconsistent testimony by the law enforcement witnesses regarding the events leading up to
the copying and destruction of the original tape.
Here, Mr. Ish put forth into evidence six incidences of failing to follow procedures and
policies, including chain of custody procedures.

As such, he established bad faith and the

inference of bad faith, which could be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the reckless
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loss or destruction of the original VHS tape. See Big O Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho at 824. Mr. Ish
demonstrated:

(1) procedures and policies were clearly not followed in the copying of the

original VHS tape where there was testimony that it would have been a violation of procedure
for the tape to have been copied absent documentation by evidence technicians, unless a copy
was made when it was checked out by an officer. (Trial Tr., p.997, L.25 - p.998, L.13; Aug.,
3/16/16 Tr., p.71, Ls.14-18.); (2) yet the only officer who checked it out of evidence, Sergeant
Daniels, denied ever copying it. (Trial Tr., p.997, L.25 - p.998, L.13; p.1352, Ls.12-23; p.1353,
Ls.5-6; Aug., 3/16/16 Tr., p.71, Ls.14-18); (3) only a small portion of the original VHS tape was
copied (Cf, Trial Tr., p.1332, Ls.5-17; Defs Exh. G), without explanation as to why and no
information as to whether the copy was edited (although the original was a 24-hour period so the
one minute copy was clearly not a complete copy of the original) or otherwise modified; (4)
Detective Brown's testimony conflicted-he testified both that he had checked the DVD out
from the evidence technicians (Trial Tr., p.143, L.4 - p.144, L. 10), and later, that he was simply
handed the case file and the DVD was inside the file (Trial Tr., p.1315, Ls.2-6; p.1316, Ls.1-7;
p.1326, Ls.2-8); and (5) the original VHS tape was destroyed in error-technicians purportedly
following a supervisor's order negligently failed to realize the case was not closed-department
policy only permitted destruction of evidence from cases 45 days past adjudication (Aug.,
3/16/16 Tr., p.68, Ls.6-10; Trial Tr., p.994, Ls.2-14.) Further, the State initially refused to tum
over the DVD to the defense-Mr. Ish was forced to file a motion to compel in order to obtain a
copy of the DVD. 4 (Trial Tr., p.1552, Ls.9-15; R., pp.438-39.)
Policy violations, failure to maintain an accurate chain of custody, evidence mishandling,

4

The State's copy had four camera views; Mr. Ish's copy only showed two camera views. (Trial
Tr., p.1337, L.23 -p.1338, L.11.) This discrepancy has yet to be explained.
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law enforcement's inconsistent testimony, and the State's apparent concealment of the DVD
copy, leads to a conclusion of bad faith. Destruction of a videotape of the last moments of the
victim of a high profile homicide investigation, is reckless and/or, at least, gross negligence.
(R., p.439.) There is a flagrant violation of police procedure in preserving the evidence, as well

as a void in the requisite chain of custody because the tape was checked out and copied by an
individual entirely unknown. (R., p.439.)
The State quotes the district court's language describing the DVD copy as, "an alleged
DVD copy of the VHS tape was made, but there is no evidence to suggest who made the copy, if
the copy is an accurate and complete reflection of the original, and for what purpose it was
made." (Respondent's Brief, p.26.) The State has unclean hands in this situation. The State
objected to the admission of the DVD copy of the original videotape, claiming it could not be
authenticated (Tr., p.1334, L.4 - p.1343, L. 18), because it was not clear whether the period of
time the DVD copy captured contained images from the night and around the time in question,
yet it was the State's mishandling (and ultimately the destruction) of the evidence in violation of
the chain of custody that caused the video to be unable to be authenticated.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Declined To Give Mr. Ish's Jury Instruction Regarding
Spoliation
When spoliation is an issue in a criminal case, multiple remedies are possible. In order to

establish a due process violation such that dismissal or suppression of evidence may be
appropriate, the defense must show "bad faith" on the part of the government. See Arizona v.

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). However, a jury instruction on spoliation may be given
absent a finding of "bad faith."

See State v. Fain, 116 Idaho, 82, 96 (1989) (holding that

although dismissal was too extreme a sanction where no due process violation had occurred, a
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jury instruction would have mitigated the prejudice to the defendant); Courtney v. Big O Tires,
Inc., 139 Idaho 821, 824-25 (2003) (dealing with whether jury instruction on evidentiary
significance of a party's conduct in losing or destroying evidence was appropriate); see also
United States v. Sivilla, 714 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding government's spoliation of
evidence was not in bad faith, which would deprive defendant of due process; however,
defendant was entitled to a remedial jury instruction at trial); State v. Hartsfield, 681 N.W.2d
626, 629 (Iowa 2004) (reaffirming the distinction between the proof required for a spoliation
instruction and the proof necessary to establish a constitutional violation of due process rights,
and holding "a defendant can be entitled to a spoliation instruction without showing that a refusal
to give the instruction would be an infringement of his right to due process."). The district court
erred in denying Mr. Ish' s motion to dismiss and his requested jury instruction on spoliation. 5
Idaho courts utilize a "balancing approach" that was initially set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 1979), and
was first applied by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82 (1989). Situations
in which a jury instruction on spoliation may be given do not require the same analysis as the
constitutional due process violation. (See Section A, infra; Appellant's Brief, pp.42-47.). In
Mr. Ish's case, the district court failed to recognize the distinction in Idaho case law and used

5

Mr. Ish asked the district court to instruct the jury as follows:
Evidence has been presented that the Pocatello Police Department took custody of
a VHS tape which contained surveillance footage of the inside of Duffy's Tavern
on the evening of June 14, 2009. If you find that the loss of the VHS tape was
deliberately or negligently brought about by the actions of the Pocatello Police
Department, you may infer that the VHS tape was unfavorable to the State of
Idaho's position.

(R., p.914; Trial Tr., p.1344, L.11 -p.1345, L.8; p.1551, L.20 -p.1553, L.18.)
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precisely the same "bad faith" analysis both in deciding whether Mr. Ish's due process rights had
been violated which would warrant sanctions, and whether a jury instruction was necessitated.
(Trial Tr., p.1556, Ls.3-15.) To show sufficient grounds for a spoliation jury instruction, Fain
requires the following:
The proper balance is that between the quality of the government's conduct and
the degree of prejudice to the accused. The government bears the burden of
justifying its conduct and the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating
prejudice.
Fain, 116 Idaho at 95 (quoting Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d at, 1152).

The State claims that the balancing approach used by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v.
Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 95 (1989), to determine whether a jury instruction on spoliation would have

been appropriate "has been rejected as the appropriate due process standard in favor of the bad
faith approach ofYoungblood."6 (Respondent's Brief, pp.30-31.) In support of this position the
State cites to nothing.

(Respondent's Brief, p.31.)

The State seeks a rejection of Fain's

balancing approach and posits that the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Edney, 145 Idaho
694, 698-99 (Ct. App. 2008) (distinguishing Fain), is demonstrative of the reviewing courts'
rejection of the balancing test set forth in Fain. (Respondent's Brief, p.31.) The State also
claims that the decision by the United State Supreme Court in Youngblood, demonstrates that the
courts are rejecting the balancing approach. (Respondent's Brief, pp.30-31.) Not only is this an
unwarranted stretch of Edney, which simply distinguished the facts of that case from Fain and in
no way rejected the use of a balancing test overall, but the State miscalculates the timing of
Fain-the Idaho Supreme Court decided Fain in 1989, after the Arizona v. Youngblood decision

in 1988. Further, Fain is still controlling precedent where Edney was an Idaho Court of Appeals
decision which did not, and could not, overrule Fain.
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Although information concerning the events inside the bar could be obtained from the
witnesses present, the district court overlooked the fact that the witnesses' testimony had been
highly contradictory as to what Mr. Ish was wearing, his movements around the bar, and whether
he was bothering bar patrons. Mr. Ish had no opportunity to request or review the videotape
because it was destroyed before he was charged in the case. At the time the State destroyed the
evidence, it did not have a charged suspect, but it did know that the videotape showed the last
hour(s) of Mr. Red Elk on the premises where the mortal injury occurred-it was a recording of
whom the victim interacted with and his movements in and around the bar. The destruction of
this evidence prejudiced Mr. Ish's ability to rebut the State's case and to present his defense.
For the above reasons, Mr. Ish asserts that the district court erred by finding that the State
had not destroyed the original VHS tape in bad faith. The court erred by finding that Mr. Ish's
due process rights had not been violated and by denying him relief.

VI.
In Telling The Jury The Manslaughter Elements "Produced" And "Cause" Were Synonyms, The
District Court Erroneously Instructed The Jury, Thereby Lowering The State's Burden Of Proof
And Violating Mr. Ish's Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Ish asserts that the district court erred in when it improperly instructed the jury as to
the necessary causation for voluntary versus involuntary manslaughter in response to a jury
question. By telling the jury that "caused" and "produce" were synonyms, the district court
negated any difference between the two manslaughters. The district court's answer lessened the
State's burden of proof, violating Mr. Ish's right to a fair trial.
Mr. Ish fully set forth his arguments in his Appellant's Breif, and the State's arguments
as to this issue do not necessitate a response.

6

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
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VII.
These Errors In The Aggregate Deprived Mr. Ish Of His Right To A Fair Trial
As argued above and in Mr. Ish's Appellant's Brief, the district court abused its
discretion by granting the State's motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum for its voir dire
notes, improperly admitting evidence of Mr. Ish' s inappropriate conduct in the Bourbon Barrel,
and admitting unreliable in-court witness identifications. See Parts II-IV. These evidentiary
errors, taken individually, are not harmless. But, even if these errors are deemed harmless
individually, these errors in the aggregate reveal the absence of a fair trial.

If not harmful

individually, these errors in the aggregate deprived Mr. Ish of a fair trial.

CONCLUSION
Due to the unlawful discrimination in jury selection, erroneous Jury instructions,
unreliable witness identifications, and spoliation of evidence, Mr. Ish respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss and remand this case
for an order of dismissal. In the alternative, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial in light of the structural and
evidentiary errors.
DATED this 14th day of June, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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